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845 
EFFICIENT EXCLUSIONS: IMPROVING  
THE EFFICIENCY OF UNITED STATES 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 
EXCLUSION ORDER ENFORCEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Litigation, like diplomacy and war,
1
 is economics by other means. But 
when the briefs are set aside and a decision is issued, every victorious 
litigator is faced with the inevitable question of how the client’s victory 
can best be enforced fully, effectively, and efficiently. If the successful 
litigator argued a matter of unfair-importation patent infringement before 
the United States International Trade Commission (“U.S. ITC”), the short 
answer may be to presume that once a Final Determination and Exclusion 
Order has been issued, all that remains is to allow the Order to work its 
effect. In reality, the answer is more complex.  
In today’s global economy, there are at least two situations in which 
enforcing a U.S. ITC exclusion order may be exceedingly difficult. 
Enforcement is neither so straightforward as to expect infringers to 
comply, nor is it conducive to U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
Service (“CPB”) identifying and excluding all infringing products. 
Today’s global economy includes both difficult-to-identify manufacturers 
in states with weak intellectual property rights,
2
 and complex 
technological products comprised of a multitude of discrete, but non-
readily-identifiable, “build-up” components.3 Either of these may be 
difficult to identify, and neither the client, nor the U.S. ITC or the CBP 
will necessarily have any particular store of knowledge regarding them. In 
 
 
 1. To subvert General Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz’s famous maxim: “war is not 
merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a 
carrying out of the same by other means.” GENERAL CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 24 (Colonel 
J.J. Graham trans., 1874) (1909), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946-h/1946-h 
.htm.  
 2. One anecdotal example drawn from this author’s experiences in U.S. ITC litigation as an 
intellectual property paralegal is the occurrence of a named defendant manufacturer in China that fails 
to respond to the complaint, and little is known but an apparent business name and an address to which 
to address the complaint. 
 3. An example of “build-up” components is the components of complex electronics. For 
instance, a stereo that would not, in and of itself, directly infringe but for the fact that one or more of 
its subcomponents infringes a valid and enforceable U.S. patent. Obviously, barring self-identification 
of the imported product by the importer or by the complainant, detection of imports containing such 
infringing products is difficult or nearly impossible; short of disassembly, there may be little 
information about such complex products that would place the CBP on notice that it contains 
components subject to a U.S. ITC exclusion order. 
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these situations, enforcement may prove exceedingly difficult, even when 
a litigant has successfully obtained a U.S. ITC ruling and an exclusion 
order in its favor. Further complicating the issue, enforcement must 
comply with both domestic and international legal constraints as well as 
the economic pressures of the global economy.  
Therefore, while the U.S. ITC’s growing popularity as a forum for the 
litigation and enforcement of intellectual property rights speaks to its 
benefits as a forum, two significant questions remain. First, how can U.S. 
ITC exclusion orders best be efficiently and economically enforced? 
Second, are there reforms that would improve the efficiency of enforcing 
such orders, particularly those directed at non-readily identifiable 
infringing products or their producers? 
This Note will examine post-litigation enforcement of U.S. ITC 
exclusion orders, as authorized under § 337 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code,
4
 with the goal of suggesting mechanisms to improve the 
efficiency of enforcement. It will also consider methods that may improve 
the efficiency of exclusion orders in preventing the importation and sale of 
products produced by non-readily identifiable manufacturers in foreign 
states, or products comprised of non-readily identifiable “build-up” 
components that may be subject to U.S. ITC exclusion orders. Finally, this 
Note will suggest legislative, administrative, and legal mechanisms that 
might improve the efficacy of enforcing such orders in accordance with 
constraints imposed by domestic and international legal obligations. 
Part I of this Note presents a brief introduction. Part II provides a 
general overview of relevant information regarding the global economy 
and intellectual property as well as an outline of the structure and 
relationship of institutions and legal agreements relevant to a discussion of 
U.S. ITC litigation and enforcement. Part III outlines the intricacies 
involved in enforcing U.S. ITC exclusion orders. In particular, Part III 
highlights the institutional relationships and the institutional differences 
and considerations involved in enforcing U.S. ITC exclusion orders. Part 
IV discusses potential reforms, beginning with a brief discussion of prior 
commentators’ suggestions, and followed by the author’s own analysis 
and suggestions. Part V of this Note provides a brief conclusion.  
 
 
 4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1948). This section of the code, as well as litigation before the U.S. 
ITC in general, are frequently referred to as “§ 337” by those familiar with this type of litigation. In 
this Note, I will adopt this terminology. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/4
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II. BACKGROUND 
In an increasingly internationalized and technology driven global 
economy, intellectual property—patents, trademarks, and service marks—
are an increasingly important component in the growth and protection of 
businesses and national economies. The value of intellectual property to 
individual rights-holders cannot be overstated: intellectual property 
holdings—the value of patents, trademarks, and service-marks held by a 
company—may very well represent more than half of the market value for 
the average company listed internationally.
5
 Moreover, failure to exploit 
the value of intellectual property assets may account for nearly $1 trillion 
U.S. dollars in foregone annual value by U.S. based companies alone.
6
  
The importance to corporations of intellectual property at the national 
level highlights the strategic economic value of intellectual property in the 
global economy. But the value of intellectual property, as with any asset, 
depends on its legal protection.
7
 While developed nations, such as the 
United States, have established an increasingly robust and interconnected 
intellectual property regime,
8
 studies suggest that a significant percent of 
intellectual property is now developed in emerging markets,
9
 generally 
regarded as intellectual property weak or uncertain regimes.
10
 Such 
developments may be of particular concern to national economies; imports 
of industrial supplies (excluding crude oil), capital goods (computers, 
telecommunications, commercial parts), and consumer goods (including 
medicine) account for 86.9% of all U.S. imports.
11
 Leading the list of U.S. 
 
 
 5. 4 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TECHNOLOGY EXECUTIVE CONNECTIONS: EXPLOITING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 9 (2007), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/ 
gx/technology/pdf/exploiting-intellectual-property.pdf.  
 6. Id. 
 7. See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual 
Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2010). 
 8. See KLAUS SCHWAB, WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009-
2010, at 131, 145, 147, 153, 183, 319, 321 (2009), available at http://www.areadevelopment.com/ 
article_pdf/id85808_Global%20Competitiveness%20Report.pdf (ranking Denmark 6th, Finland 3rd, 
France 10th, Germany 13th, Japan 20th, the United Kingdom 21st, and the United States 19th of 133 
countries surveyed on the basis of the strength of domestic legal protection of intellectual property 
rights). 
 9. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 5, at 32 (stating that “43% of [the report’s] 
respondents say that significant IP is now being created in emerging markets”). 
 10. See id. at 33 (reporting that the vast majority of executives believe that IP protection in 
emerging markets is weak).  
 11. The World Factbook—United States, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2011), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last updated Dec. 13, 2012). 
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trade partners is China, generally regarded as a relatively IP-weak state,
12
 
which accounts for 18.4% of all U.S. imports
13
 but accounts for 80% of all 
goods seized by the CBP in the 2007 fiscal year as counterfeit or pirated.
14
 
As a final twist, while intellectual property protection regimes are 
increasingly interconnected at the global level,
15
 functional enforcement 
continues to exist only at the national level.
16
 This consists of territorial, 
national state-based regulation of specific registration, and import/export 
legal enforcement mechanisms.
17
  
Two critical realizations of intellectual property protection spring from 
these facts: intellectual property protection is only as good as (1) the 
ability and willingness of states to police and prevent the unauthorized use 
of intellectual property at the design and manufacturing stage, and (2) the 
ability and willingness of states to police and prevent traffic of infringing 
goods at the point of importation and sale. Ultimately, where states are 
unable to rely on trading partners to sufficiently enforce intellectual 
property protection at the manufacturing level, or when domestic rights-
holders do not possess foreign intellectual property rights,
18
 states and 
domestic rights-holders must rely on import-focused controls. 
 
 
 12. SCHWAB, supra note 8, at 117 (ranking China 45th out of 133 countries surveyed on the basis 
of the strength of legal protections for intellectual property rights). 
 13. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 11.  
 14. See THE NAT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS ON COORDINATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND 
PROTECTION 52 (2008), available at http://2001-2009.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/@doc/@os/ 
@opa/documents/content/prod01_005189.pdf [hereinafter REPORT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION].  
 15. Intellectual property protection at the international level now spans more than one hundred 
years, including such agreements as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(1883), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of International Property Rights (1994). 
 16. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 102, 154 (The “Patent Act”) (including several stipulations 
restricting the enforcement and prior art considerations for patentability to the United States). 
 17. See, e.g., REPORT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 
14 (providing an example of the United States as enforcing rights domestically as opposed to 
internationally).  
 18. Because the process of obtaining protection for intellectual property, such as patents, occurs 
at the national level, the costs of obtaining such protection in each and every country may be 
prohibitive. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 5, at 22 (noting that the cost of a multi-
jurisdictional international patent can exceed € 200,000). Thus, it is not uncommon for rights-holders 
to forego protection in many places. Where a domestic rights-holder does not hold a counterpart patent 
in a foreign state, it has no power to prevent others from making or selling the product subject to its 
patent in the foreign state where it does not hold a patent. One consequence of this, however, is that 
domestic rights-holders may find themselves in the position of rightfully attempting to exclude from 
import into and sale in the United States products that may not lawfully be imported into the United 
States (because the rights-holder holds a valid U.S. patent), but which may be lawfully produced and 
sold elsewhere. In this situation, a domestic rights-holder has no option, other than dependence on the 
fair play of competitors, but to rely on import-focused inspection and exclusion of such goods. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/4
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A. Structural Basis of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights 
In the United States, origination of most federally enforceable 
intellectual property rights
19
 occurs through the administrative approval 
process for patents, trademarks, and service marks. Administrative power 
is vested in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“U.S. PTO”)20 
as authorized by, and in compliance with, applicable domestic statutes and 
international treaties.
21
 Legal enforcement of patents outside of the 
administrative context of registration and cancellation is accomplished by 
the United States federal courts
22
 and the U.S. ITC.
23
 Finally, the 
Department of Homeland Security, through the CBP, is responsible for 
enforcing import/export regulations.
24
 In this capacity, the CBP bears 
responsibility for detecting and detaining imports subject to U.S. ITC 
exclusion orders, cease and desist orders, and for physical enforcement of 
those orders at the point of importation into the United States.
25
 
1. The United States International Trade Commission 
The U.S. ITC plays an increasingly central role in trade-related patent 
litigation in the United States. Originated in 1916 as the United States 
Tariff Commission,
26
 it was granted investigatory powers to enforce tariff 
and trade regulations under the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.
27
 In the 
1970s, the U.S. ITC began to develop into its current form, first as an 
advisory agency to the president, and eventually emerging as the 
executive-branch enforcement agency for unfair trade practices in the 
 
 
 19. Although some forms of intellectual property rights may have been historically enforced at 
common law, this Note focuses solely on the intellectual property rights protected at the federal level 
and recognized through the issuance of U.S. patents. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 153 (1975). 
 21. 35. U.S.C. §§ 100-212 (1946); see also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (1946).  
 22. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (1975). (“For an act of infringement described in paragraph [(2)(A)] 
the court shall order . . . .”). 
 23. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (1975) (Tariff Act of 1930 as Amended). 
 24. This was formerly and historically known as the United States Customs Service, from July 
31, 1789 until March 1, 2003. See Timeline, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT. (2010), 
available at http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/TimeLine_062409.swf.  
 25. United States Customs and Border Protection Directive 2310-006A, Exclusion Orders (2001), 
available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legal/directives/2310-006a.ctt/2310-006a.pdf 
[hereinafter Directive] (setting forth a general outline of CBP responsibility and mechanisms for 
enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders). 
 26. Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 529, 540 (2009). 
 27. Id. at 541. 
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United States under the Trade Act of 1974.
28
 That act amended § 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 to grant the U.S. ITC investigatory, adjudicative, 
and enforcement power over individuals and companies engaged in unfair 
importation practices, such as patent infringement.
29
 Most significantly, 
the 1974 revision grants the U.S. ITC a singularly powerful tool: the 
power to exclude from importation articles found to be the object of unfair 
trade practices after a finding of patent infringement.
30
 Notably, the 
exclusionary power extends to the investigatory period prior to a finding 
on the matter, during which the U.S. ITC is authorized to issue an order 
excluding products under investigation from importation unless subject to 
a bonding provision.
31
  
The U.S. ITC’s exclusionary power is sweepingly broad in nature. The 
U.S. ITC may issue two types of exclusion orders. First, the U.S. ITC may 
issue a limited exclusion order prohibiting the importation of items by 
importers that the ITC has found to be infringing.
32
 Second, and in more 
limited circumstances, it may issue a general exclusion order broadly 
prohibiting the importation of infringing goods regardless of whether the 
particular product or importer identified for exclusion was specifically 
named or identified in the U.S. ITC action.
33
 Furthermore, § 337 instructs 
the U.S. ITC to “[consider] the effect of such exclusion,” giving the U.S. 
ITC authority to adapt exclusion orders as it sees fit.
34
 
2. U.S. ITC and the Federal Courts: Fundamental Differences 
In modern patent litigation, several factors differentiate U.S. ITC and 
U.S. district court patent litigation practices. They include the intellectual 
property specialization of the U.S. ITC staff attorneys who investigate and 
participate in U.S. ITC administrative hearings and the U.S. ITC 
Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) who administer U.S. ITC 
 
 
 28. Id. at 542–44. See also Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 171, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) 
(noting the name change from the United States Tariff Commission to the U.S. ITC). 
 29. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). 
 30. Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1975) (codified the exclusionary power of the U.S. ITC). 
 31. See id. The intent of this measure is to ensure protection of a complainant’s economic 
interests should the Commission’s investigation ultimately find the accused—or “targeted”—goods to 
have been unfairly imported due to infringement of a valid and enforceable U.S. patent. Because 
“irreparable harm” to the complainant may result from the continued importation of infringing goods 
during the period of investigation (a period of about one-and-a-half years), it was deemed reasonable 
to allow the U.S. ITC to offer some mitigation to complainants during the period of investigation after 
the filing of the complaint. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(1) (1975). 
 32. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d)(2). 
 33. Id. § 1337 (d)(2)(A). 
 34. Id. § 1337(d)(1).  
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investigative hearings.
35
 U.S. ITC litigation is also notably rapid, typically 
concluding in 15–18 months—significantly less time than the two years it 
may take litigants to reach trial in district court proceedings.
36
 But, while 
the specialization and speed of the U.S. ITC patent practice undoubtedly 
influences rights-holders to litigate in this forum, two factors in particular 
differentiate U.S. ITC and U.S. district court patent litigation: jurisdiction 
and enforcement mechanisms. 
The U.S. ITC and U.S. district courts differ in their jurisdictional reach. 
While the district courts are limited by the in personam nature of federal 
court jurisdiction,
37
 the U.S. ITC jurisdiction is in rem and therefore 
unlimited by national boundaries.
38
 Because U.S. ITC jurisdiction attaches 
to the allegedly infringing or unfairly traded goods themselves, rather than 
to the allegedly infringing or unfairly trading corporations or individuals, 
complainants before the U.S. ITC may pursue accused infringers who are 
not otherwise within the jurisdiction of U.S. district courts.
39
 In fact, a 
complainant before the U.S. ITC in an in rem proceeding may pursue 
 
 
 35. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, YEAR IN REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 2009, 31–32 (2009), 
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/pub4167.pdf. Although studies 
conducted over the past decade have come to differing conclusions as to the material impact of such 
specialization on U.S. ITC outcomes (for instance, as determined by such measures as comparative 
analyses of claim construction reversal rates in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for cases 
adjudicated by the U.S. ITC and U.S. district courts), there can be no doubt that U.S. ITC staff 
attorneys and ALJs overseeing patent claims specialize in these cases, which constitute a substantial 
proportion of U.S. ITC practice. See id. (reporting that 24.8% of U.S. ITC activity and 26.0% of 
operational costs for FY 2009 were attributable to “Intellectual Property-Based Import 
Investigations”). The report also indicates that the Commission handled eighty-four “Intellectual 
Property-Based Import Investigations” in one manner or another during FY 2009. Id. at 31. 
  For examples of the varying conclusions reached by different studies concerning the apparent 
effect of U.S. ITC patent specialization on case outcomes, see David L. Schwartz, Courting 
Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before 
Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 
1712–29 (2009) (suggesting that U.S. ITC ALJs are not noticeably better at construing patent claims 
than are U.S. district court judges); Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent 
Infringement Cases: A review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
457, 477–80, 490 (finding increased reversal rates of U.S. ITC infringement findings, suggesting 
agency is too friendly to complainants asserting patent infringement); see also Christian A. Chu, 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1075 (2001) (analyzing U.S. ITC claim-construction reversal rates before the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit). 
 36. Kumar, supra note 26, at 537 (suggesting an average timeline of seventeen months from 
filing to final determination in U.S. ITC proceedings). It should be noted, however, that following 
administrative reforms instituted in 2008 extending the target dates at various stages of proceeding, 
average start-to-finish timelines may now be somewhat longer by a period of one to three months.  
 37. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 38. Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the 
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 73 (2008). See also 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(A)(1)(a). 
 39. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 35, at 471–72.  
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litigation against infringing imports even if it is unable to identify the 
specific party(s) engaged in the accused infringement.
40
 Furthermore, 
these jurisdictional differences mean that ITC litigants have a broader 
range of discovery and subpoena powers available to them than litigants in 
actions before the U.S. district courts.
41
 
While jurisdiction plays a significant role in the complainants’ choice 
of forum, perhaps the single most important difference between U.S. ITC 
and U.S. district court litigation—and the primary driving force of the U.S. 
ITC as a forum for unfair competition patent infringement litigation—is in 
the stark differences in remedial action available in each forum. It is the 
unusual exclusionary power of the U.S. ITC
42
 that drives the practice of 
patent enforcement litigation in the forum and most notably defines the 
bifurcation of remedies available in intellectual property enforcement 
matters in the United States. 
Although the U.S. ITC holds the extraordinary power to exclude 
infringing goods from the United States and to issue cease and desist 
orders
43
 to defendants found to have engaged in continued importation and 
sale of infringing goods, it has no power to award monetary damages upon 
a finding of infringement or unfair competition.
44
 Moreover, U.S. ITC 
exclusion orders are directed to the CBP, allowing “automatic” exclusion 
of goods.
45
 In contrast, litigants proceeding before the U.S. district courts 
may seek an award of monetary damages upon a finding of patent 
infringement, but the federal courts have no specific power to exclude 
infringing goods from importation into or sale within the United States.
46
 
 
 
 40. The particularly powerful feature of in rem jurisdiction is that so long as a complainant can 
identify the allegedly infringing import product and that product is within the physical jurisdiction of 
the United States (such as at a CBP inspection facility), the U.S. ITC can assert jurisdiction over that 
product and proceed with an investigation even though it could not otherwise reach the specific 
individual or corporation responsible for producing the allegedly infringing import. Id. 
 41. See Kumar, supra note 26, at 535. 
 42. For an in depth discussion of the exclusionary power of the U.S. ITC, see supra Part I.A. 
 43. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (detailing the power of the ITC to issue cease and desist orders).  
 44. Id. § 1337. In fact, it is only upon a finding that (a) a product infringes a valid U.S. patent and 
should be subject to an exclusion order; (b) that notwithstanding the issuance of an exclusion order, 
importation continued; and (c) that upon continued importation, a cease and desist order was issued 
and subsequently violated by continued importation, that the U.S. ITC may levy monetary fines 
against an infringing importer. See id. § 1337(f)(2) (noting that if the Commission determines that an 
importer has violated a cease and desist order, the monetary penalty accrues not to the favor of the 
original complainant, but as a forfeiture to the United States). 
 45. See Joseph H. Heckendorn & Lyle B. Vander Schaaf, Gray Market Trademark Infringement 
Actions at the U.S. International Trade Commission: The Benefits of the Forum and Analysis of 
Relevant Cases, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 271, 276 (2009); see also Kumar, supra note 
26, at 537–38. 
 46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283–85 (1952) (providing jurisdiction to federal courts to award particular 
forms of relief to claimants). 
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In this regard, litigants proceeding before U.S. district courts may at best 
argue for injunctive relief prohibiting the continued sale of such goods by 
defendants.
47
 
Underlying the particular influence of this bifurcation of remedies is 
the “automatic” nature of the enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders in 
comparison to the enforcement of U.S. district court decisions.
48
 Litigants 
who succeed in obtaining an injunction from the U.S. district court must 
monitor the defendants’ subsequent actions, and when further enforcement 
action is required, they must return to the courts to seek enforcement of 
the previously issued injunction.
49
 Such a course involves not only the 
monitoring costs incurred by the rights-holder, but also the significant 
time, effort, and legal expense necessary to obtain further court-ordered 
sanctions against violators of previously issued injunctive relief.
50
 In 
comparison, an exclusion order issued by the U.S. ITC relies on the U.S. 
government, through the CBP, for enforcement of the relief.
51
  
In short, one particularly attractive feature of U.S. ITC litigation to 
rights-holders is that a valid U.S. patent holder may seek a remedy against 
importation of infringing articles even when the manufacturer or importer 
of the article is unknown or resides in a country with weak intellectual 
property protection. Then upon a favorable resolution of the matter, a 
complainant before the U.S. ITC may place at least some reliance on the 
power of the U.S. government to assist in enforcing the remedy.
52
 
3. The ITC, National Enforcement, and International Law 
Although the registration, administration, and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights ultimately hinge on national territorial 
 
 
 47. See id. § 283. 
 48. Compare id. §§ 281, 283–85 (remedies available in U.S. district courts) with Directive, supra 
note 25 (remedies available before the U.S. ITC). 
 49. See KSM Fastening Systems v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Directive, supra note 25. This fact should suggest to potential litigants that the U.S. ITC 
exclusionary remedy is, at least notionally, a significantly less costly solution for a complainant to 
enforce post-litigation. As this Note will highlight in further detail below, however, both the 
“automatic” nature of the exclusion order enforcement and its presumed effectiveness are illusory. 
While the exclusion orders are directed at the CBP for enforcement, an active and engaged 
complainant willing to assist and support the CBP in identifying infringing or likely infringing imports 
should play a key role in ensuring efficient and effective enforcement of such orders.  
 52. While there are countless nuances defining the two paths of patent litigation, it is the 
confluence of jurisdiction and remedy that defines the critical difference between U.S. ITC and U.S. 
district court patent litigation. See supra text accompanying note 40; see also Kumar, supra note 26, at 
535. 
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enforcement policies, enforcement of intellectual property rights has 
increasingly global implications. While U.S. ITC litigation is inherently 
national, its global effect has been felt since at least the 1980s
53
 and is ever 
more intertwined with international agreements and trade. Moreover, as 
the frequency of patent litigation before the U.S. ITC increases, these 
trends are bound to continue due to the systematic internationalization of 
intellectual property protection under international law.
54
  
While the United States has long been party to international agreements 
relating to the protection of intellectual property,
55
 recent agreements have 
spawned direct challenges to the U.S. ITC as a particular method of 
intellectual property and trade enforcement within the United States.
56
 In 
fact, the most recent significant revision to § 337, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988,
57
 was partly a response to previous trade 
 
 
 53. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 35, at 475 (tallying cases). Between 1972 and September 
2006, 406 of 467 patent cases before the U.S. ITC included a foreign entity as a named party. In fifty-
five of those cases, both the complainant and respondent included at least one foreign entity, and three 
cases consisted of foreign entities suing only domestic entity respondents. Id.  
 54. See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 104, available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/year_in_review/pub4167.pdf (indicating the increase in pending 
§ 337 investigations over the last decade). 
 55. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1983, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris 
Convention 1983]; GATT, infra note 56; TRIPS, infra note 56. 
 56. The United States signed both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Trade 
Related Agreement on Intellectual Property. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem 
_e.htm [hereinafter GATT]; see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter TRIPS]. U.S. ITC litigation and the U.S. 
ITC-issued “exclusion order” have both been challenged as violations of one or both of these 
agreements. See Elizabeth R. Hall, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988: Closing A Loophole 
in United States Patent Law, 13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 343, 362–65; Robert G. Krupka et al., Section 337 
and the GATT: The Problem Or The Solution?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 779 (1993). 
 57. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988). Prior 
WTO and GATT trade disputes resulted in Congress’ decision to redefine the “Domestic Industry” 
showing that a prospective complainant before the ITC was required to make in order to gain access to 
the ITC in the 1988 revision of section 1337. Under the 1988 Omnibus bill, the Domestic Industry 
clause of section 1337 was reworded to require that: 
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), an industry in the United States shall be considered to exist 
if there is in the United States, with respect to the articles protected by the patent, copyright, 
trademark, or mask work concerned 
 (A) significant investment in plant and equipment; 
 (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or 
 (C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and 
development, or licensing. 
Id. § 1342(a)(3). 
 Prior to the 1988 Omnibus bill, the Domestic Industry clause of section 1337 also required that a 
prospective complainant show that not only did a “Domestic Industry” exist, but that it was 
“efficiently and economically operated.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1987). This requirement had 
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disputes filed with the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).58 These WTO 
complaints alleged that the “domestic industry” requirement for litigants 
wishing to file complaints before the U.S. ITC violated the “national 
treatment” requirements of the Trade Related Agreement on Intellectual 
Property (“TRIPS”).59 It has also been suggested by some commentators 
that the U.S. ITC’s use of General Exclusion Orders, or Limited Exclusion 
Orders reaching “downstream products,”60 may not comply with the 
national treatment provisions of these agreements.
61
 Thus, when 
considering changes to either the underlying enabling statutes or the 
mechanisms of enforcing U.S. ITC judgments, one must consider the 
broader framework of international agreements within which the U.S. ITC 
and § 337 operate. 
III. THE COMPLEXITY OF ENFORCING EXCLUSION ORDERS 
Given the structure of intellectual property litigation,
62
 successful 
litigation before the U.S. ITC and the issuance of an exclusion order is 
only a first step in protecting rights-holders. Once issued, responsibility 
for enforcing an exclusion order falls upon the CBP.
63
 The CBP must 
examine incoming imports, locate infringing goods, and prohibit the 
importation when found.
64
 
 
 
significant implications. First, in conformity with the Act’s protectionist origins, it operated to exclude 
rights-holders (presumably foreign) who neither developed nor manufactured the protected product 
within the United States. Second, U.S. ITC litigation patterns subsequent to the 1988 revision suggest 
that it served to prevent vexatious use of the forum by non-exercising rights-holders seeking only to 
utilize the patent and forum for rent extraction purposes. See infra notes 94 and 97 for further 
elaboration of this issue. 
 58. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 59. The change in the Domestic Industry clause of § 337 was enacted specifically to address the 
“national treatment” clauses included in international agreements to which the United States is a party, 
such as the Paris Convention and TRIPS, but most notably, GATT. All of these agreements require 
that citizens of party states receive “no less” protection in foreign states than those foreign states grant 
to their own citizens. See Krupka et al., supra note 56, at 783–86, 814–15. Prior to this change, both 
the European Economic Community and Canada had alleged that the Domestic Industry clause of 
section 1337 violated the national treatment requirements of TRIPS and GATT. See id. 
 60. “Downstream products” consist of goods, generally finished or “built-up” goods, which 
would not otherwise constitute directly infringing products but for the fact that they contain or may 
contain component parts, such as semi-conductor chips, that are infringing in their design or 
manufacture. For the author’s anecdotal example of how these issues come into play, see supra text 
accompanying note 3. 
 61. See Krupka et al., supra note 56, at 866–67. 
 62. See supra Part I. 
 63. Directive, supra note 25.  
 64. See id. 
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Efficient enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders by the CBP should 
require communication and cooperation between the CBP, U.S. ITC, 
importers, and victorious complainants. Not only must the CBP identify 
and prohibit entry of infringing products, it must do so while avoiding the 
inappropriate exclusion of non-infringing products such as design-
arounds
65
 or products not covered by U.S. ITC exclusion orders.
66
 The 
CBP must also do this as quickly and efficiently as possible. Such 
cooperation, however, is not the usual case; while the U.S. ITC has the 
authority to issue the exclusion order, the CBP alone determines its 
method of enforcement and treats such enforcement actions as 
confidential.
67
 
Once the U.S. ITC has issued an exclusion order, the CBP distributes 
the order to CBP field offices along with detailed descriptive information 
regarding the articles to be excluded.
68
 Where a technical opinion is 
necessary, CBP officers may refer suspect imports to CBP laboratories for 
technical analysis to determine whether the product is covered by an 
exclusion order.
69
 The CBP actively encourages the participation of 
interested parties,
70
 and it benefits the successful U.S. ITC litigant to assist 
 
 
 65. See Ted Baker, Pioneers in Technology: A Proposed System for Classifying and Rewarding 
Extraordinary Inventions, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 452 n.69 (2003). A “design around” refers to the 
legitimate competitive practice of determining the scope of a rival’s patent claim (through litigation, or 
by good-faith analysis of the patent claims at issue) and designing a competing product as close as 
possible to the one protected by the patent without infringing the scope of the patent. See id. at 452. 
 66. The complexity of the CBP’s mission may be highlighted by referring again to the potentially 
broad nature of U.S. ITC exclusion orders. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Such orders are thus likely to be 
either over inclusive or under inclusive. For instance, where the CBP must execute a Limited 
Exclusion Order, which attaches only to specifically identified producers and product/models, other 
producers may simultaneously seek to import products which are technologically similar or identical to 
covered products, but which are not excluded from entry by the Order. Id. Conversely, a General 
Exclusion Order issued by the U.S. ITC and reaching “downstream products” may require the CBP not 
only to identify technologically identical products not specifically enumerated in the Order, but also to 
identify products that, although not infringing in and of themselves, contain infringing components 
which are covered by the General Exclusion Order. Id. An example of this latter situation would be a 
stereo, computer, or other complex electronic device containing an infringing microchip. 
  Finally, the CBP must be able to identify and properly admit products that satisfy design around 
requirements for legal entry. 
 67. See G. Brian Busey & Teresa Summers, How to Make Sure Your ITC Exclusion Order Has 
Teeth, MORRISON FOERSTER (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.mofo.com/how-to-make-sure-your-itc-exclu 
sion-order-has-teeth-08-04-2009/. 
 68. Directive, supra note 25, at 2. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Intellectual Property Right (IPR) Product Identification Training Guide, UNITED STATES 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/priority_trade/ipr/legal/training_ 
guide/ (last updated Feb. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Training Guide] (encouraging intellectual property 
rights-holders to produce intellectual property identification manuals for CBP and outlining 
information for inclusion in such manuals that CBP finds material helpful). 
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the CBP in identifying suspect imports subject to U.S. ITC exclusion 
orders.
71
 However, whether initiated by the CBP itself (ex officio), or at the 
behest of a successful U.S. ITC litigant, the CBP may investigate suspect 
imports and make administrative determinations as to whether the product 
falls within the scope of an exclusion order.
72
 
In the face of adverse CBP determinations, other avenues of review are 
available to interested litigants besides assisting the CBP in detection of 
suspect goods and enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders.
73
 Where a 
party believes that the CBP has erred in failing to exclude or to 
appropriately identify suspect imports subject to U.S. ITC exclusion 
orders, the party may return to the U.S. ITC to seek further enforcement 
action.
74
 Alternatively, an active party may seek injunctive relief before 
the U.S. district court to prevent the CBP from allowing importation of the 
suspect product.
75
 
Finally, the participation and cooperation of manufacturers and 
importers of products subject to U.S. ITC exclusion orders are important 
components of efficient enforcement. In this vein, the CBP imposes 
significant import documentation and record-keeping requirements on all 
importers.
76
 Where an importer disputes the applicability of an exclusion 
order or asserts that the product satisfies design around requirements, it 
 
 
 71. It should be noted that while enforcement of intellectual property rights remains a significant 
priority for the CBP, in the post-9/11 world, the CBP is also tasked with a multitude of significant and 
difficult tasks, including the inspection and prevention against the import of dangerous materials.  
 72. REPORT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 14, at 
80, available at http://2001-2009.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/@doc/@os/@opa/documents/content/ 
prod01_005189.pdf. See, e.g., TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS app. 5D (2007) (CBP administrative response to U.S. ITC 
litigant in investigation 337-TA-365, discussing CBP’s examination and determination and the reasons 
for each determination).  
 73. See, e.g., Eaton Corp. v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1329 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005) 
(granting injunctive relief by excluding from import products for which the CBP had previously 
accepted on the basis of importer’s certification of non-coverage under the relevant U.S. ITC exclusion 
order). 
 74. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f). Where a party is in violation of a previously issued exclusion order, 
a complaining party may seek further U.S. ITC enforcement action including the issuance of a cease 
and desist order. Id. On the other hand, if continued importation is in violation of a previously issued 
cease & desist order, seizure of the accused product and monetary fines for violation of the prior 
orders may be instituted. Id. 
 75. Eaton Corp., 395 F. Supp. 2d at 1329 (granting injunctive relief, and holding that to not 
“grant that interim relief, and then to have the [U.S.] ITC formally determine that the redesign 
[infringing product] still violates plaintiff’s patent, would engender the irreparable harm that the law is 
intended to prevent”). 
 76. See generally UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE 
TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT: RECORDKEEPING (2005), available at http://www.cbp 
.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legal/informed_compliance_pubs/icp027.ctt/icp027.pdf [hereinafter CBA 
RECORDKEEPING].  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
858 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 11:845 
 
 
 
 
may work with the CBP to permit importation.
77
 Subject to the 
specifications of the relevant exclusion order, the CBP may admit products 
for importation even though they are “potentially subject” to an exclusion 
order upon certification by the importing entity that the product in 
question is not subject to exclusion.
78
 
The obstacles the CBP faces in finding, verifying, and appropriately 
excluding or allowing incoming imports are staggering.
79
 Further, it bears 
stressing that while litigants seeking to enforce U.S. ITC exclusion orders 
may rely on the CBP to engage in the primary enforcement of the remedy, 
efficient and effective enforcement of all but the narrowest of U.S. ITC 
exclusion orders is likely to turn on the willingness of victorious litigants 
to assist the CBP in identifying imports for inspection and exclusion.
80
 
Thus, identifying mechanisms that reduce the costs borne by victorious 
U.S. ITC complainants when assisting the CBP is vitally important to the 
continued efficiency, effectiveness, and enforcement of U.S ITC exclusion 
orders. 
 
 
 77. See 19 C.F.R. § 177; 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (discussing the right to appeal CBP determinations on 
importability); see also 19 C.F.R. § 210.79 (2007) (permitting a party to induce the CBP to make a 
determination that a redesigned product is not subject to an ITC exclusion order). 
 78. See, e.g., Certain Semiconductor Chips Having Synchronous Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Controllers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-661, USITC 3 (July 26, 2010), 
available at http://info.usitc.gov/sec/exclusion.nsf/72b1a4074ed08da7852567fd0064ad21/04fcfce93f8 
291f785257774007645df/$FILE/337-ta-661.pdf. In generic language, the relevant passage states that 
importation of goods “potentially subject” to the exclusion order may be permitted “at the discretion” 
of “and pursuant to procedures [established by]” CBP where the importer certifies that they are 
familiar with the order, and that “to the best of their knowledge and belief” the products are not 
excluded from entry under the order. Id. The order also provides that CBP may require such records or 
analyses as necessary to verify the truth of the certification. Id. 
 79. In 2010 alone, the value of U.S. imports surpassed $2.3 trillion U.S. dollars, all of which 
entered the United States under the auspices of, and subject to, exclusion by the CBP. UNITED STATES 
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES—BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASIS 
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf. 
 80. Again, one particularly significant consideration is that while victorious U.S. ITC 
complainants may look to the U.S. government for primary enforcement of exclusion orders issued by 
the U.S. ITC, effective enforcement of such orders is likely to be far less strict without participation by 
the party entitled to exclude competitors. For instance, in addition to helping the CBP identify 
particular imports worthy of inspection, an active litigant might choose to dispute a CBP determination 
of an exclusion order or that imports should be conditionally admitted under bond. See, e.g., Eaton 
Co., 395 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. 
 Thus, while enforcement of exclusion orders may not depend on self reliance and monitoring by a 
successful litigant as it is for injunctions issued by U.S. district courts, its effective enforcement—
particularly of orders directed at complex imports, “downstream products,” or non-readily-identifiable 
products or producers—is likely to require increasing levels of participation by victorious litigants.  
 Finally, despite the facial “burden-shifting” of enforcement costs in U.S. ITC litigation, it should 
become clear that one implication of this is that effective enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders by 
an active litigant will not be “costless” to the litigant in comparison to U.S. district court injunctions, 
despite the comparatively greater governmental role in enforcing U.S. ITC exclusion orders. 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY 
OF § 337 ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ITC EXCLUSION ORDERS 
A. Problems in Enforcing U.S. ITC Exclusion Orders 
As discussed above, the enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders is 
subject to two particular burdens. First, CBP enforcement of such orders 
requires the CBP to quickly and effectively identify and exclude imports 
properly subject to such orders. Second, there is a rising tide of U.S. ITC 
litigation at a time of multiplying CBP concerns and an increasing volume 
of international trade and regulation. 
1. A Brief Discussion of Prior Commentary 
Previous commentators have suggested various solutions to the 
complicated issues surrounding U.S. ITC patent litigation and 
enforcement. Such proposals have included restructuring the language 
underlying the ITC’s § 337 patent enforcement powers to better protect 
domestic industries,
81
 prohibiting dual-track litigation and binding district 
courts to U.S. ITC decisions,
82
 synchronizing U.S. ITC and district court 
remedies,
83
 or eliminating the U.S. ITC as an agency of intellectual 
property rights enforcement entirely.
84
 Each of these proposals contains 
serious or fatal flaws. Suggestions that Congress return the U.S. ITC to its 
Tariff Era trade protectionist roots fly squarely in the face of modern 
international trade law and directly conflict with international agreements 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), TRIPS, 
and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, to 
which the United States is a party.
85
  
Similarly, binding one court’s rulings to those of the other ignores the 
significant difficulties inherent in reconciling the executive agency 
determinations and procedural processes of the U.S. ITC with the powers 
 
 
 81. Kumar, supra note 26, at 548. 
 82. Id. at 562–64 (discussing the relationships between the U.S. ITC and U.S. district courts, the 
interplay of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, and suggesting that Congress should 
reform § 337 to grant U.S. ITC decisions collateral estoppel effect in U.S. district court proceedings). 
 83. Chien, supra note 38, at 108-09.  
 84. Krupka et al., supra note 56, at 859-60 (discussing proposals by the United States Trade 
Representative and American Bar Association, in 1991 and 1992 respectively, to eliminate the U.S. 
ITC as currently incarnated). 
 85. See TRIPS, supra note 56; Approval and entry into force of Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 
U.S.C. § 3511(5)(a) (1994); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2, Sept. 28, 
1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs 
_wo020.html. 
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and procedural rights afforded to litigants by Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution
86
 in federal courts.
87
 Abolishing the U.S. ITC as currently 
incarnated would resolve issues of a dual-track system without raising the 
constitutional concerns associated with binding Article III courts to U.S. 
ITC rulings. The substantial role and popularity of the U.S. ITC in patent 
and intellectual property enforcement, however, suggests that such a baby-
with-the-bath-water
88
 approach fails to consider the substantial benefits 
provided under the current § 337 ITC regime.
89
 
B. Suggestions for Increased Efficiency of U.S. ITC Exclusion Order 
Enforcement 
As discussed above and in prior commentary, the ITC has proven a 
successful and popular forum in the fight against patent infringement. Its 
very popularity, however, serves to drive the dilemma addressed here; in 
short, the efficiency with which U.S. ITC determinations can be obtained 
may not be matched by the efficiency of customs enforcement of ITC 
determinations. Moreover, the sheer volume of ITC determinations and the 
significance of their impact for U.S. trade may contribute to a decline in 
the efficiency and value of the ITC process. In light of these 
considerations, the remainder of this paper suggests certain legislative and 
structural remedies that may increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
 
 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. III. Critical differences may arise in the rights afforded litigants in “Article 
III” courts as opposed to non-Article III courts such as Administrative-Agency Courts like the U.S. 
ITC. See Krupka et al., supra note 56, at 792–811 (outlining procedural differences between the two 
forums). Because Article III courts grant litigants Constitutional, substantive, and procedural rights, 
procedural differences may emerge between these and other courts not bound to the same procedural 
guarantees. Id. Of particular note here are the procedural protections available in Article III courts, 
including more leeway in scheduling and response periods for litigants that may slow litigation in 
comparison to U.S. ITC adjudication. Id. 
 87. These differences present particularly severe—and quite probably insurmountable—
difficulties in reconciling the relative “problems” of each forum while maintaining the relative benefits 
of the different forums vis-à-vis each other. For instance, the U.S. ITC is a popular forum because of 
its adjudication speed as well as the powerful remedies available. In contrast, U.S. district court 
litigation is not known for its speed, but by virtue its remedies, as well as that Constitutional and 
procedural guarantees afforded litigants in an Article III court, it may be more protective of litigants’ 
rights. One way to frame the discussion is that each forum offers one advantage at the expense of the 
other. The U.S. ITC reduces some procedural protections for litigants in favor of speedy adjudication, 
while U.S. district courts provide the opposite. Binding one forum to the other may forfeit whatever 
“advantage” each forum held individually. As a result, litigants in one forum would be exposed to the 
weaknesses of the other. Moreover, binding Article III courts to U.S. ITC decisions would raise 
serious constitutional issues.  
 88. This American idiom reflects the concept of discarding a good idea along with a bad idea. 
 89. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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the CBP’s enforcement of exclusion orders in the hope of promoting the 
continued efficiency of the agency. 
1. Amend § 337’s Domestic Industry Requirements to Exclude Mere 
Licensing 
Congress should again amend § 337’s domestic industry requirements 
to obligate U.S. ITC complainants to demonstrate that they are engaged in 
an industry related to the asserted patent, and it should not allow mere 
licensing.
90
 As discussed in prior literature, the move to include “mere 
licensing” as a qualifying activity under the domestic industry prong of 
§ 337, without any domestic development or production component, has 
undoubtedly contributed to the increase in § 337 litigation. The relaxation 
of the requirement, while easing access to the U.S. ITC for foreign rights-
holders in response to foreign complaints,
91
 also permits previously 
excluded non-producing rights-holders to access the forum.
92
 Amending 
the section to require some actual development or production would 
narrow the range of litigants potentially eligible to obtain exclusion orders 
by expelling domestically inconsequential or vexatious litigants. At the 
same time, the forum would remain available for litigants actively invested 
in creating or utilizing the technology at issue within the United States. 
Such a move would reduce the likelihood of conflict between the United 
States and trading partners over U.S. ITC enforcement. Further, any 
reduction in litigants before the U.S. ITC would reduce the enforcement 
burden on the CBP. The end result would be increased efficiency.
93
 
It must be noted that eliminating the licensing clause of the domestic 
industry requirement would exclude some classes of foreign intellectual 
property rights-holders whose access may not be detrimental to the 
effectiveness or efficiency of the CBP’s enforcement.94 At this cost, 
 
 
 90. Professor Colleen Chien also noted this potential reform. See Chien, supra note 38, at 109–
10. Professor Chien similarly suggested that amending § 337 in this fashion would serve to retain the 
forum’s original purpose of fostering domestic industries, while also serving to filter out complainants 
unlikely to satisfy the test for injunctive relief in U.S. district courts as set out in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
 91. See Hall, supra note 56 at 362–65; Krupka et al., supra note 56. 
 92. See Chien, supra note 90, at 109–10. 
 93. Furthermore, this amended definition of the domestic industry clause may provide a healthier 
balance between the protection of recognized intellectual property rights with the important and 
traditional interest in fostering domestic industry, which originally underpinned the creation of the 
U.S. ITC. See supra Part II.A.1 (providing background on the historical origins and motivations in 
creating what would become the U.S. ITC). 
 94. Removal of U.S. licensing as an activity sufficient in and of itself to support a finding of a 
domestic industry in order to establish U.S. ITC jurisdiction under § 337 would principally affect 
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however, such a change in the domestic industry clause would deny access 
to socially costly U.S. ITC litigation and remedies
95
 to a class of 
particularly vexatious
96
 litigants: the patent trolls.
97
  
In addition to denying access to patent trolls,
98
 such a modification of 
§ 337 comports well with the findings of prior economic social-welfare 
analyses of § 337 litigation.
99
 Moreover, such litigants would continue to 
have access to U.S. district courts, which have the ability to levy 
reasonable royalties upon a finding of infringement.
100
 
Finally, it bears noting that amending the domestic industry clause to 
exclude “mere licensing” would not necessarily violate the United States’ 
international obligations. While this clause was last amended to address 
concerns relating to “national treatment” requirements101 of the GATT and 
WTO disputes, excluding “mere licensing” should create no facial legal 
disparity of national treatment; on its face, such an exclusion impacts 
domestic firms engaged in mere licensing as well as foreign firms.
102
  
 
 
rights-holders who engage in their own development, engineering, and production of the product at 
issue entirely overseas, and it would seek only to license the product within the United States, such as 
licensed production of the product by a subsidiary or non-related company. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) 
(current domestic industry clause); see also infra note 102 (discussing the implications for U.S. trade 
relations of the wording of a further amended domestic industry provision in § 337). Finally, note that 
U.S. rights-holders denied access to the U.S. ITC by a new amendment would still retain the ability to 
seek relief in U.S. district courts. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–84. 
 95. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 35, at 461. 
 96. Admittedly, the exact degree of vexation may depend on the reader’s perspective. 
 97. John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2007) 
(describing “patent trolls” as rights-holders who “do not provide end products or services themselves, 
but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing the work of others”). The author also 
acknowledges prior commentators’ inability to agree on a specific definition of the term, lending 
credence to the idea that both the precise definition and the degree of vexation of patent trolls is to be 
found in the eye of the beholder. 
 98. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 35, at 468 (quoting FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras for the 
proposition that “an injunction may allow a patent owner to appropriate more than the full value of its 
invention”). 
 99. Id. at 468. Hahn and Singer discuss Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange for the notion that where the true purpose of litigation is rent-extraction, appropriate 
remedies should consider to what extent the claiming party practices the patent in dispute, as well as 
the relative importance and value of the patent asserted in proportion to the value of the assembled 
product against which it is asserted. Id. In this instance, Kennedy’s analysis suggests that denial of 
certain venues or remedies (here, recourse to the U.S. ITC and resultant exclusion orders) to non-
practicing rights-holders (such as patent trolls) is a reasonable action where the denial of venue or 
remedy promotes a more economically efficient arrangement. Id. Moreover, the notion that such 
excluded rights-holders would retain access to U.S. district courts and monetary damage awards 
available therein comports with Kennedy’s statement in eBay that, when rent extraction is the only 
motivation, “legal damages may well be sufficient . . . and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest.” eBay, Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97. 
 100. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 101. See Hall, supra note 56, at 362–65; Krupka et al., supra note 56. 
 102. Theoretically, under the naked wording of such an amendment, the resulting exclusion would 
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2. Require the CBP to Re-Institute a Modified Variation of the “Patent 
Survey” Formerly Required Under C.F.R. § 12.39 
Congress should require the CBP to institute a program similar to its 
former “Patent Survey” program to electronically collect and disseminate 
import data concerning the make up and manufacture of imports and the 
components potentially subject to U.S. ITC exclusion orders. To facilitate 
patent enforcement, such a program should (1) require the CBP to 
electronically collect information from importers, identifying the type and 
number of build-up components in products and the manufacturers from 
whom the importer purchased the sub-components, and (2) provide 
electronically searchable access to the data for interested rights-holders to 
facilitate patent enforcement.  
Between 1956 and 2004, the CBP administered a program known as 
the “Patent Survey,” with the goal of assisting patent holders in obtaining 
the information necessary to pursue § 337 claims against potential 
infringers.
103
 Under the Patent Survey program, the CBP, at the request of 
patent holders and upon payment of specified fees,
104
 would notify 
requesting patent holders of the names and addresses of entities importing 
articles “appearing to infringe a registered patent.”105 As originally 
administered, upon receipt of a request that it conduct a “Patent Survey,” 
the CBP would determine “which tariff provisions [might] apply” to the 
patent at issue, and then it would determine which imports identified under 
the relevant provisions might infringe the specified patent.
106
 By 2003, the 
 
 
apply to U.S. based rights-holders as well, although it is admittedly harder to identify the effected class 
in actual practice. Under the plain terms of such an amendment, however, any rights-holder, whether 
native or foreign, engaged in the substantive development or exploitation of the asserted right within 
the United States, will continue to meet the domestic industry requirements of § 337. Those entities 
which cannot show a substantive investment in the development or exploitation of the right within the 
United States other than mere licensing would not satisfy the domestic industry requirements of an 
amended § 337 regardless of corporate domicile. 
  Because the relevant clauses in prior disputes concerned the requirement that domestic laws 
provide “no less” protection to foreign rights-holders than to domestic rights-holders, a limitation 
which applies equally to parties regardless of nationality should satisfy obligations under international 
agreements. This is true even if, as here, it appears more likely to impact foreign domiciled litigants in 
practice. Thus, such an amendment should avoid running afoul of the “national treatment” clauses of 
international agreements to which the United States is a party. 
 103. Patent Surveys, 69 Fed. Reg. 52811-02 (Aug. 30, 2004) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pts. 12, 24) 
(notice of Final Rule amending Customs and Border Protection Regulations to eliminate Patent 
Surveys, previously codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.39, 24.12(a)(3)). 
 104. 19 C.F.R. § 24.12(a)(3) (1963). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Patent Surveys, 69 Fed. Reg. at 52811-02 (discussing the process by which the CBP 
conducted a “Patent Survey” and explaining the CBP’s conclusions that this was no longer practical). 
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CBP regarded the provision as ineffective, inefficient, and unworthy of 
continued administration; it was discontinued in 2004.
107
 
As previously instituted, the CBP’s decision to terminate the “Patent 
Survey” program appears incontrovertible. Given the ease of electronic 
document inspection in the internet-age, however, the previous “Patent 
Survey” program and the CBP’s current recordkeeping documentation 
requirement could provide the seed for a modified program to improve the 
efficiency of enforcing U.S. ITC exclusion orders.  
Rather than requiring patent holders to rely on the unwieldy 
classification of “likely infringing” imports resulting from the previously 
administered Patent Survey program, the CBP should be instructed to 
require the recordkeeping and reporting of “build-up” components used in 
the production of products subject to U.S. ITC exclusion orders. This may 
prove difficult, however, for the CBP or rights-holders to identify.
108
 
Similar recordkeeping and reporting could be required of those importing 
technological products likely to implicate downstream product issues. This 
could entail requiring importers of designated electronic goods 
(computers, cellular phones, etc.) to document basic information 
concerning the manufacturer of internal components such as microchips.  
Furthermore, by requiring the electronic filing of such documents, the 
CBP could provide electronic access to such documents in searchable 
format to interested patent holders.
109
 Interested rights-holders, litigants, 
and even the CBP itself could then search and cross-reference these filings 
using this information to identify potential infringers for suit. Likewise, 
they could use this information to assist in identifying potentially 
troublesome imports for further CBP investigation or action pursuant to an 
exclusion order. 
 
 
 107. In its notice of final rule making, the CBP noted that the procedure was simply incapable of 
producing particularly reliable reports. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 52811-02. Prior to conducting a survey, the 
CBP was required to classify the relevant tariff provisions applicable to a particular patent. Id. This 
task was regularly complicated by the broad and technologically advanced nature of some patents. 
Thus, Patent Survey results were often either over or under inclusive of potentially infringing imports. 
The CBP also noted that between 1956 and 2001 it had gone from processing one million entries per 
year to more than 23 million. By 2003, the CBP deemed the survey unworthy of continued efforts as it 
was only receiving about ten requests per year. 
 108. For instance, such a program might require importers to list the number and type of internal 
components, such as batteries or microchips, as well as the name and contact information of the 
manufacturer from which the producer of the built-up product purchased those sub-components. In 
short, such a system would be akin to a requirement that a prime-contractor list the name and contact 
information of all sub-contractors. 
 109. The CBP could, of course, require a reasonable fee to finance administration of the program 
and database. 
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As noted, the CBP may require relevant verifiable documentation upon 
entry.
110
 In addition to “basic” records including names, addresses, 
location, and contact information for parties originating, importing, and 
receiving imports, the CBP requires and collects a variety of specialized 
forms tailored to particular imports and importers.
111
 Among the required 
records is an “Assembler’s Declaration”112 for companies importing goods 
utilizing “assists.”113 The “Request for Information” document is 
straightforward, and relevant information could reasonably be obtained in 
intelligible, electronic searchable form.
114
 In light of the information 
already collected by the CBP on the “Assembler’s Declaration” and 
similar forms, requiring the CBP to collect similar information related to 
“build-up” components should not greatly interfere with the CBP’s current 
practices and procedures.  
This modified program increases the efficiency of enforcing 
outstanding U.S. ITC exclusion orders for both the CBP and rights-
holders. For the CBP, such declarations, particularly in conjunction with 
the certification program already administered and subject to U.S. ITC 
orders, should narrow and ease the process of determining which imports 
are most worthy of inspection. For rights-holders, this system provides 
several advantages. First, it supplies an efficient means to oversee the 
enforcement of hard won exclusion orders. Second, it provides an 
opportunity to assist the CBP in identifying potentially troublesome 
imports worthy of further CBP inspection. Finally, when necessary, it 
allows rights-holders to seek further review of CBP determinations. 
Such a requirement could also provide an efficient mechanism for 
rights-holders in build-up components to protect against infringement 
 
 
 110. The Customs Procedural Reform Act of 1978, 19 U.S.C. § 1509 (2010) (providing the CBP 
authority to require records not only for tariff purposes, but to verify the correctness of an entry, to 
determine liability for duties and taxes, to determine liability for fines, penalties, or forfeitures, and to 
ensure compliance with laws administered by the CBP). See also CBA RECORDKEEPING, supra note 
76. 
 111. See infra notes 113 & 114 (discussing various types and examples of common documentation 
required of importers by the CBP). 
 112. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 10.24. 
 113. An “Assist” is defined by the CBP as an item provided by the buyer of the imported 
merchandise at free or reduced costs, for use in the production, sale, or export of the imported item 
back to the United States. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., FORM 28, 19 C.F.R. 
§ 151.11 (2011), available at http://forms.cbp.gov/pdf/CBP_Form_28.pdf. Assists may include 
(1) material, components, parts, and the like incorporated in the import; (2) tools, dies, molds, or like 
used in the production of the import; (3) merchandise consumed in producing the import; and 
(4) engineering, development, art, design work, or plans undertaken anywhere other than the United 
States and necessary for the production of the import. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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through the use of unauthorized, hard to detect build-up components 
within complex imports. This is especially relevant when extended to 
importers of products particularly likely to suffer from downstream 
product problems, such as complex electronics. In a similar vein, requiring 
manufacturers and importers to list the makers of build-up components in 
the imported products could assist litigants in identifying the down-stream 
products of “hard-to-identify producers”115 and dissuade such producers 
from defaulting at U.S. ITC proceedings.
116
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As illustrated by its rapidly increasing popularity, the U.S. ITC has 
proven itself to be a remarkable forum for the litigation and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights. No institution is perfect, however, and the 
U.S. ITC is no exception. This is true in spite of its speed and uniquely 
powerful nature of the remedies that it employs. Yet, sometimes its 
imperfections are a result of these characteristics as has been discussed 
both here and by previous commentators.
117
 The U.S. ITC is an institution 
at the confluence of competing interests, influences, and obligations in the 
political, economic, and judicial domains. 
As outlined here and in prior commentary,
118
 perhaps the most 
challenging obstacle to the continued operation of an efficient and 
efficacious U.S. ITC is the need to find efficient mechanisms for 
identifying potentially infringing imports and enforcing exclusion orders.  
Simple steps could greatly improve the efficiency of the U.S. ITC and 
the enforcement of U.S. ITC exclusion orders. These include (1) redrafting 
the domestic industry clause of § 337 to exclude mere licensing as 
sufficient grounds for establishing a domestic industry subject to U.S. ITC 
jurisdiction, and (2) requiring the CBP to collect and report in 
electronically searchable form to interested rights-holders basic 
information regarding the “build-ups” used in imports potentially subject 
 
 
 115. It should be noted that importers who provide inaccurate information would not only expose 
themselves to the penalties provided under federal law, but would also provide a valuable piece of 
evidence against themselves in future U.S. ITC or U.S. district court litigation. 
 116. Increasing the amount of information gathered regarding original manufacturers, even at a 
basic level, would decrease the likelihood that hard to identify manufacturers in IP weak states will 
shirk compliance with intellectual property rights in the belief that their infringement is likely to go 
undetected or that rights-holders will be unable to identify them. 
 117. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 35; Heckendorn & Schaaf, supra note 45; Chien, supra note 
38; Golden, supra note 97; see generally Kumar, supra note 26. 
 118. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2012] EFFICIENT EXCLUSIONS 867 
 
 
 
 
to U.S. ITC exclusion orders or subject to the “downstream product” 
problem. 
These changes would provide several important outcomes. First, they 
would diminish the incidence of vexatious or otherwise inconsequential 
litigation within the forum, and thus the enforcement burden upon the 
CBP attributable to these litigants. Second, they would increase the 
efficiency of exclusion order enforcement by the CBP. Third, this 
mechanism would allow active litigants to more efficiently oversee and 
assist enforcement. In the face of increasing global trade in intellectual 
property, these reforms should foster improved long-term efficiency and 
efficacy of the U.S. ITC.  
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